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Start from the assumption that the Democrats were hard pressed, no matter what they did. In the approach to the election, political analysts pointed out an inescapable structural problem: that no incumbent party had prevailed when so many voters felt that the country was "headed in the wrong direction" (polltakers' maddeningly though understandably vague formulation, to be discussed below). Moreover, the Democrats had held the White House for twelve of the preceding sixteen years. The pendulum of favor was against them.
Then contemplate the discretionary factors that seem to have compounded the structural ones unnecessarily. Therein lie the pointers to the way forward. What follows is not an attempt at expert electoral calculation, but a consumer's-eye view of the political marketplace.
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When polltakers ask voters whether the country is "headed in the right direction" or not, they're presumably trying to build a comprehensive indicator of mood. There's value in that. However, there are no pointers in it. A preponderantly negative response is just bad news for incumbents, like the little scrap of paper with a black spot on it that you get if you're a doomed character in Treasure Island. A respondent may be thinking about one or more aspects, respectively, of economic conditions or social trends or national security or governance — or about some combination thereof. We can look at the responses to more precise questions and guess at the meaning of the "wrong direction" response, but such a guess may be perturbed by wishful thinking or deliberate spin. Some commentators, for example, have attributed the Democratic defeat to the disappointment of voters who longed for a hard left turn. Others (if not the same ones in the next breath) argue that too many voters desired a turn to authoritarianism and away from social justice. Divining what most people mean when they say the country is headed in the wrong direction is a subjective exercise. Herewith, one highly subjective attempt.
The most probable and variously co-existing components of the "wrong direction" verdict are these:
• Dismay at the affective polarization of society
• Alarm at the consequences of a laissez-faire stance on immigration
• A valid, if imperfectly conceived, sense of economic injustice
• Resentment of overbearing minoritarian activism
It's pretty clear that Donald Trump was not returned to power by a popular revolt against norms, much less by white supremacism. As Isaac Saul points out in Tangle (with links), white voters were the one racial demographic that shifted toward the Democratic Party in this presidential election.
Here's a fact to consider: Kamala Harris did better with white voters than Joe Biden did, but worse with nonwhite voters. Not only that, but the group that has shifted most toward Democrats since Trump broke onto the scene is white men. Democrats lost because everyone except for white voters moved in the direction of Donald Trump this cycle. How is that for a narrative buster?
Note also that Trump did not gain support in comparison with 2020 so much as he benefited from a decline in support for the Democratic alternative. As for that decline, those who wish to blame it on misogyny are free to do so but must recognize that the heralded host of women for Kamala Harris did not show up. Before the election, the Obamas and other prominent Democrats practically declared that if Harris lost it would be because men had not backed up their women by voting for her. In the event, however, women themselves didn't vote for her in droves. An unprimed observer of the outcome would never guess that this election had been expected to signify a great divergence between the sexes or that Trump was supposed to be acceptable only to white nationalists. Among the negative lessons to be learned by Democrats, those two are high on the list.
Among the positive lessons, it seems the chief one is the least edifying: that even when a candidate is shockingly abnormal, many voters will absorb the shock and proceed to vote on issues of the day, with the most elemental concerns weighing most heavily. They'll punish the incumbent party for the things they don't like and give the opposition a chance; and in the elections of 2026 and 2028, the Democrats will be the opposition.
Though elemental concerns weigh most heavily, rarefied ones can tip the scales. Polling shows that the Trump campaign's ad attacking Harris over the microniche issue of sex-change services for prison inmates was markedly effective in swaying undecided voters. But the weight of that one issue is inseparable from the pre-existing weight of the overgrown trans lobby, which has gained a presence in politics and public debate far out of proportion to the size of the interest group represented or to any danger threatening that group's members. The actual rights of transgender people are protected by the 2020 US Supreme Court ruling in the case of Bostock v. Clayton County and subsequent lower-court rulings that apply its logic. Today's routine invocation of "trans rights" cloaks a demand for submission to the lobby itself. But no one can claim a right to go unchallenged in a sociopolitical venture. People know it's a bluff, and those outside the sphere of tame progressives are going to call it.
The extent to which bumptious identitarian projects hurt the Democratic Party is debatable, but hurt it they do. Now, with the campaign to dissolve the identity of woman in an acid of trans hubris and non-binary improvisation, leftist identitarianism has reduced itself to the tyranny of minority factions. This may always have been the destiny of the social-justice Left. But if the Democratic Party prefers a destiny of winning elections and thus gaining the power to do good, the minoritarian fever must break. Americans with more catholic concerns need not feel any guilt about treating it with cold water when they get the chance; and there's no chance quite like an election.
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From the Democratic Party's collective persona, take away the penchant for cultural experimentation. Take away the left-reactionary impulses like neoracism and degrowth mania. Take away the dim mentality that expects to hammer society into shape by dint of indoctrination. Take those things away, and what you get is a mere skeleton crew of a Democratic organization. After all, personnel is policy. Progressives demanded oversight of personnel in the nascent Biden administration; they got it; and America got policies and proclamations that, coming from Joe Biden, had the ring of ventriloquism. That is to say, the electorate got something it didn't ask for. To form a future administration free of such deceit, Democrats will have to form one free of personalities that would connive at it. That goes for congressional staffs as well. It goes for all those entities, internal and external, that should want the party to win for the common good more than they want to use the party for their own purposes.
It is, of course, a dispiritingly tall order: accomplishing a reformation of the Democratic ecosystem at the level of personnel. In November, Yascha Mounk published a pessimistic and, alas, masterful analysis of the broader problem of reformation that approached its conclusion as follows:
This finally brings us to the most fundamental obstacle to a real course correction: the staffers, the donors, and the activists who are the real decision-makers in the Democratic Party. Democrats are disproportionately dependent on young staffers who have recently graduated from prestigious colleges. Many of these staffers have been socialized in the hothouse culture of campus activism in which one supposedly offensive remark can lead to lasting social ostracism. And since they stand at the beginning of their careers, they often have a greater incentive to demonstrate ideological purity than to win the next election [emphasis added].
Progressive activists outside the Democratic Party can take a cavalier attitude toward its electoral fortunes, as some openly do; but the presence of such people throughout the staffs of the party itself, of its officeholders, and of its candidates amounts to rampant entryism by agents of a competing interest, albeit a loosely defined one. Hard as it may be to replace them, the thing must be done. One of the most widely noted blunders of Kamala Harris's recent campaign, her refusal to visit the podcaster Joe Rogan for a long interview, seems to have been due to a fear of offending progressives, as represented by members of her staff, to whom Rogan is beyond the pale. Sitting for the interview might not have changed the outcome of the election, but turning up one's nose at such a chance is a luxury Democrats can't afford from here on. Party-scorning sociopolitical snobs may not care. Democrats have got to care.
Donors, be their pockets ever so deep, are a lesser concern. It's been hard to accept the idea that elections are not won by outspending the opposition, especially with journalists and political pros always calling our attention to war chests and advertising budgets, but it's a lesson Democrats were overdue to learn before the bitter experience of this past presidential election. In 2020, I donated part of my mite to the US Senate campaign of Jaime Harrison in South Carolina. Mine was part of a flood of out-of-state donations that ended in Harrison's raising more money than any other senatorial candidate in national history. Nevertheless, he lost by more than ten percentage points to the supposedly vulnerable incumbent, Lindsey Graham. This year, Kamala Harris's campaign famously raised over a billion dollars. Though they spent that and more, the best they could do was to narrow the margin of defeat in battleground states. The spending might have been done more judiciously, but probably not enough more so to matter.
"There is not a single expenditure in a different spot that would have changed the outcome of the race," said Bakari Sellers, a close ally of Ms. Harris and a former lawmaker in South Carolina. In fact, Mr. Sellers said, the campaign faced an unusual problem: "We had so much money it was hard to get it out the door."
Donors matter, of course, but not so much that they ought to be treated as customers who are always right. Donors who don't like the way the party changes can be relieved by donors who do.
As for activists, specifically those obstreperous leftists who appear to be of the Democratic Party but not in it, they and the onlooking world should be made to understand that they are not even of the party if they function as litigants and not as stakeholders. The attitude that it's not their job to help Democrats win elections (which some have proclaimed outright) should let them in for adversarial treatment just as if they represented a separate party. Since they haven't joined one or formed one, they obviously recognize that they need the vehicle of the Democratic Party more than it needs their seal of approval. Above all, the party should beware of academics and their political potions. Any party should value knowledge and expertise, but none should take its lead from academics.
Wild as these thoughts are, they unfortunately comprise the one vital seed of future prosperity for the Democratic Party. If it's out of the question to cultivate that seed, then the party will surely become a barren tract containing only a citadel of the elite.
Tyler Austin Harper, writing in The Atlantic, recounts a recent conversation with Democratic Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut, who posed a question for his copartisans to face: "Does the Republican Party become more economically populist in a genuine way before the Democratic Party opens itself up to people who don't agree with us on 100 percent of our social and cultural issues?" Murphy may have been speaking diplomatically out of consideration for progressive sensibilities, but the proposition of a Democratic Party that "opens itself up to people who don't agree with us on 100 percent of our social and cultural issues" implies telling voters, "Yes, we hold these positions that you abhor, but we've decided not to chastise you for disagreeing with us. You're welcome in our tent." That would be perversely ineffective. The transformation of a dim Democratic future into a bright one must begin with a transformation of the party's character. It can't remain a party characterized by people who incline toward positions that repel the median voter. The problem is not the way the party chooses to behave, but the kind of political community it is in the first place. This is not yet a problem with rank-and-file members, despite the growing proportion of progressive college graduates. It's a problem with operatives.
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The Democratic Party must demonstrate the ability, but first of all the will, to take America in a direction that seems about right to most Americans. That should not strain any Democrat's basic principles. There is no popular demand for Darwinian competition or social homogeneity, any more than for Marxism or social atomization. Most people value fairness. They also value peace of mind. They want a combination of freedom to get ahead and freedom from being calamitously left behind. That's an opening for Democrats, even as Republicans show early signs of trimming their sails.
The Republican metaphor for America is a gold field suited to fortune-hunters. Let the Democratic metaphor be a community suited to good neighbors. Yes, the community will be inclusive and nurturing. It will be a community of many parts, and it will be supportive where support is needed. But the main electoral appeal should be made to core interests that unite the parts and sustain the vitality of the whole.
— "The Voyage to Restoration" (2018)
Once, that was pretty much what the Democratic Party stood for. The electorate didn't turn away from it; the party did. As avant-garde academics and social activists gained influence, the party abandoned the principle of literal inclusivity for an inclusivity-branded strategy of setting the most numerous groups back on their heels. It forsook the unity of parts for the meteoric supremacy of one little part after another and forsook the vitality of the whole for a nihilistic disavowal of the whole. Inversion and dissolution became implicit goods. In this way, the Democratic Party passed through the looking-glass.
As those last words were being set down, Matt Yglesias published an important essay in which he illuminates an actual inversion — a momentous one — in the Democratic coalition itself.
To understand the role and stature of the groups in Biden-era Washington, it's worth reading some of the old articles about Obama-era Washington and "the veal pen."
This was progressive blogger Jane Hamsher's derisive term for a "tightly-managed coalition of Democratic groups centered financially around the Democracy Alliance and organizationally around the Center for American Progress, both in turn creations of the left in exile in the Bush years." These groups had standing calls and meetings with members of the Obama administration. And their funders, the Democracy Alliance donor circle, were also major donors to Barack Obama and to Democratic Party candidates. The purpose of these coordinating calls and meetings was for the groups to speak their mind and get access to the White House and feel included in the process. But really the purpose was for the White House to tell the groups what it wanted them to say. The role of the groups was to try to generate positive press coverage for the administration, to sell progressives on the merits and necessity of compromises the administration made, and to create an "echo chamber" that amplified the administration's messages.
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So I think ultimately, the veal pen was right all along: Politics is a strong and slow boring of hard boards, and it requires convincing people to vote for you in elections.
But that's not what happened. Instead, we got the Sanders insurgency, a wave of "woke" academic concepts migrating from Tumblr onto the mainstream internet, Trump's shocking win, a thermostatic swing of public opinion to the left, a surge of donations to progressive advocacy groups, "the squad," Elizabeth Warren's laser focus on personnel, and a new conventional wisdom that 2009-2010 was a huge disappointing failure rather than a big success.
The upshot of all of this is that between 2013 and 2021, the basic logic of the veal pen inverted.
Rather than mainstream progressive advocacy groups working to amplify Joe Biden's message and create good press for him, they threaten him and other Democrats with bad press unless they hew to progressive orthodoxy. This is done in collaboration with progressive staffers and like-minded journalists [emphasis added].
Yglesias goes on to note that the Republican coalition had the discipline, this year, to act on the "veal pen" principle, with anti-abortion activists and plutocrats counseling tolerance of Trump's populism and his relative moderation on abortion for the sake of winning the election.
Democratic presidential candidates would find it hard enough to campaign under either the handicap of being attacked by "the groups" or the handicap of adopting their impolitic positions, without an adverse change in the electoral map. However, The Atlantic's mercilessly attentive Jerusalem Demsas has noticed that the most adverse of changes is in fact taking place. In "The Democrats Are Committing Partycide" she writes, "Democrats' self-conception as a party that represents the future is running headlong into the reality that the fastest-growing states are Republican-led."
According to the American Redistricting Project, New York will lose three seats and Illinois will lose two, while Republican-dominated Texas and Florida will gain four additional representatives each if current trends continue. Other growing states that Trump carried in this month's election could potentially receive an additional representative. By either projection, if the 2032 Democratic nominee carries the same states that Kamala Harris won this year, the party would receive 12 fewer electoral votes. Among the seven swing states that the party lost this year, Harris came closest to winning in the former "Blue Wall" of Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania—at least two of which are likely to lose an electoral vote after 2030. Even adding those states to the ones Harris won would not be enough to secure victory in 2032. The Democrat would need to find an additional 14 votes somewhere else on the map.
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Population growth and decline do not simply happen to states; they are the result of policy choices and economic conditions relative to other states. Some states lose residents because their economy hasn't kept up with the rest of the country's. But in much of blue America, including California and New York, economic dynamism and high wages aren't enough to sustain population growth, because the skyrocketing cost of shelter eclipses everything else. ... Policy failures are dragging down the Democrats' prospects in two ways: by showing the results of Democratic governance in sharp, unflattering relief, and by directly reducing the party's prospects in presidential elections and the House of Representatives.
Democrats who wish to avoid partycide have got to break out of the looking-glass world in which activism makes for stasis, parts bedevil the whole, service to a theory beats service to society, and then one day the election of a Republican by a demographic cross-section of the electorate elicits murmurs of "At last the country is coming together!"
That breakout won't be accomplished by persuading the people who oppose it or by striking a bargain with them, but only by dominating them with superior organization and leadership and, as necessary, driving them out. Yes, it's a wild thought. But if Demsas is right (and you know she is); if Mounk and Yglesias are right (and you know they are); then the time has come to think it. Personnel is the problem.